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DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, INVESTMENT 
AND CROWDING OUT: PROBLEMS OF 
CAPITAL FORMATION IN PAKISTANI 
MANUFACTURING 
By Robert E. Looney* 
INTRODUCTION 
Toward the end of 1988, Pakistan's deteriorating 
resource situation caused a financial crisis many remnants of 
which still exist today. In 1988 the Government's budget deficit 
reached 8.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), inflation accel-
erated, the current account deficit doubled to 4.3% of Gross 
National Product (GNP), the external debt service ratio 
reached 28% of export earnings, and foreign exchange reserves 
fell in half to $438 million, equal to less than three weeks of 
imports.I 
These developments have eroded the ability of the gov-
ernment to affect the country's development process. In fact, 
the encouragement of private sector activity, particularly 
investment, is the only viable option open to the authorities. It 
follows that for policy purposes the most important issue 
involves restructuring government expenditures and their 
financing in a manner that would provide the maximum induce-
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ment to private sector capital formation, especially in manu-
facturing. Operationally, this means finding an optimal bal-
ance between the Government's three most important bud-
getary items: defense, public consumption and infrastructural 
development. More importantly because there is abundant evi-
dence2 that the government's deficits have crowded out a cer-
tain amount of private investment, the authorities must 
achieve this balance within the context of a reduced level of 
expenditures and/or tax increases. 
Defense expenditures are a logical area for budgetary 
cuts: current expenditures account for the major part of gov-
ernment budgetary allocations, averaging 65-75 percent in 
recent years. In fact, in recent years defense expenditures 
together with debt servicing have accounted for around 80 per-
cent of current expenditures. 
While not necessarily arguing that reduced defense 
expenditures would free sufficient funds to restore the coun-
try's deteriorating capital stock,3 the purpose of this paper is to 
examine whether defense expenditures have affected the pri-
vate sector's willingness and ability to invest in manufactur-
ing. Has the general impact of defense expenditures on private 
investment in manufacturing differed significantly from that 
associated with other categories of government expenditures? 
If so, in what regard? Are these differences associated with the 
manner in which defense and ·expenditures in other areas are 
funded? 
The analysis below is largely quantitative since a key 
element in assessing these issues revolves around the issue of 
causality. That is have the Pakistani government_s expendi-
tures resulted in a follow-on set of effects on private invest-
ment or, instead, has private investment created pressures for 
the government to expand its expenditures? In turn, answer to 
these questions will in large part determine the appropriate 
strategies for fiscal policy. 
• 
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BACKGROUND 
As noted, previous studies have suggested that govern-
ment expenditures in Pakistan have been a mixed blessing. On 
the one hand, these expenditures have the potential to 
increase private sector profitability either through increases in 
aggregate demand (the Keynesian effect) and/or cost reduc-
tions (the infrastructural effect). On the other hand, public 
expenditures appear to compete for funds with the private sec-
tor, thus reducing ceteris paribus the total volume of private 
capital formation. 
Apparently these affects vary by expenditure category. 
For example, infrastructure investment has played a passive 
role in stimulating follow-on private investment.4 Surprisingly, 
there is little evidence that government investment in manu-
facturing crowds out private investment. Instead there is a 
much greater likelihood that other forms of government invest-
ment may be responsible for the private sector's funding diffi-
culties. In particular government investment in public enter-
prises and general government investment seem to be more 
responsible for the country's increasing fiscal imbalances. 
Little can be said on these issues until the issue of cau-
sation is adequately resolved: 
1. Often in studies of this type the direction of causation 
has implicitly been assumed to go from government 
deficits to expanded domestic borrowing to interest rate 
increases and ultimately reduced private investment. 
One could just as easily argue that increased levels of 
private investment have placed pressure on the govern-
ment to expand facilities, especially in energy. The gov-
ernment, wishing to aid private investment while 
simultaneously lacking adequate funding for major 
infrastructural programs, may first grant the private 
sector various forms of relief such as tax holidays fol-
lowed by modest increases in public investment. The 
• 
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outcome of this process would be expanded deficits, but 
not necessarily the crowding out of private investment 
in the classical sense. The causation issue must be 
addressed before any definitive conclusion can be made 
concerning crowding out. 
2. As a related issue, the timing of these impacts needs to 
be identified. Many effects associated with government 
deficits are likely to have a delayed impact on private 
investment decisions. Again because the timing of these 
effects has not been identified, the patterns of causation 
are unclear. 5 
3. If we assume that interest rate effects are only one fac-
tor associated with the government deficit as it pertains 
to private investment, the theory of crowding out 
becomes unclear as to the relevant form of the bud-
getary deficit. If the interest rate mechanism is not per-
fect, are private investors more concerned or affected 
(through perhaps credit rationing) by the actual deficit, 
some sort of expected deficit, unanticipated changes in 
the deficit, or even deviations in the deficit from some 
longer run budgetary trend? 
4. The environment in which deficits exist needs to be 
identified. Obviously, if deficits stem largely from 
increased government consumption or defense, their 
negative impact on private investment will be greater 
than if they had stemmed simply from increased infras-
tructural investment. 
5. The financing of the public sector deficit and govern-
ment capital formation needs to be examined in detail. 
Have the deficits been associated with government 
investment or consumption? How have the deficits been 
financed as between domestic and foreign borrowing? 
Do the impacts of domestic versus foreign borrowing 
295 
JOURNAL OF THIRD WORLD STUDIES 
vary with regard to their effect on private industrial 
investors?. 
THE ISSUE OF CAUSATION 
Ultimately any statistical test for causation will be 
based on a number of arbitrary assumptions. Still, using a 
number of alternative specifications for the key variables it is 
possible to make some credible inferences concerning the tim-
ing of say government expenditures and public sector deficits: 
do some types of government expenditure tend to generate a 
stream of deficits (and associated public borrowing) over time 
(soft budgetary constraint6 or are selected budgetary alloca-
tions constrained by past deficits (hard budgetary constraint). 
Similarly, which types of expenditures are more likely financed 
(or constrained) through the domestic capital markets and 
which are more reliant (or constrained) by foreign borrowing? 
The original and most widely used causality test was 
developed by Granger. 7 According to this test (again using the 
example of public expenditures and deficits), deficits (DEF) 
affect growth of public sector expenditures (PE) if this series 
can be predicted more accurately by past values of deficits 
than by past (expenditure) growth patterns. To be certain that 
causality runs from deficits to PE, past values of the public 
deficit must also be more accurate than past values of public 
expenditures at predicting increases in the deficit. 
Granger Test 
More formally, Granger8 defines causality such that X 
Granger causes (G-C) Y if Y can be predicted more accurately 
in the sense of mean square error, with the use of past values 
of X than without using past X. Based upon the definition of 
Granger causality, a simple ·bivariate autoregressive (AR) 
model for public deficits (DEF) and PE can be specified as fol-
lows: 
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p q 
(1) PE(t) = c + SUM a(i)DEF(t-i) + SUM b(j)DEF(t-j) + u(t) 
i=l j=l 
r s 
(2) DEF(t) = c + SUM d(i) DEF(t-1) + SUM e(j)PE(t-j) +v(t) 
i=l j=l 
where PE is the growth in public sector expenditures and DEF 
= the growth in public sector deficits; p, q, r and s are lag 
lengths for each variable in the equation; and u and v are seri-
ally uncorrelated white noise residuals. By assuming that 
error terms (u, v) are "nice" ordinary least squares (OLS) 
becomes the appropriate estimation method.9 
Within the framework of unrestricted and restricted 
models, a joint F-test is appropriate for causal detection. 
Where: 
(3) F = 
(RSS(x) - RSS(u)/(df(x) - df(u) 
RSS(u)/df(u) 
RSS(r) and RSS(u) are the residual sum of squares of restrict-
ed and unrestricted models, respectively; and df(r) and df(u) 
are, respectively, the degrees of freedom in restricted and unre-
stricted models. 
The Granger test detects causal directions in the follow-
ing manner: first, unidirectional causality from DEF to PE if 
the F-test rejects the null hypothesis that past values of DEF 
in equation (1) are insignificantly different from zero and if the 
F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that past values of PE 
in equation (2) are insignificantly different from zero. That is, 
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DEF causes PE but PE does not cause DEF. Unidirectional 
causality runs from PE to DEF if the reverse is true. Second, 
bi-directional causality runs between DEF and PE if both F-
test statistics reject the null hypotheses in equations (1) and 
(2). Finally, no causality exists between DEF and PE if we can 
not reject both null hypotheses at the conventional significance 
level. 
The results of Granger causality tests depend critically 
on the choice of lag length. If the chosen lag length is less than 
the true lag length, the omission of relevant lags can cause 
bias. If the chosen lag is greater than the true lag length, the 
inclusion of irrelevant lags causes estimates to be inefficient. 
While it is possible to choose lag lengths based on preliminary 
partial autocorrelation methods, there is no a priori reason to 
assume lag lengths equal for all types of deficits. 
The Hsaio Procedure 
To overcome the difficulties noted above, HsaiolO devel-
oped a systematic method for assigning lags. This method com-
bines Granger Causality and Akaike's final prediction error 
(FPE), the (asymptotic) mean square prediction error, to deter-
mine the optimum lag for each variable. In a paper examining 
the problems encountered in choosing lag lengths, Thornton 
and Battenll found Hsiao's method to be superior to both arbi-
trary lag length selection and several other systematic proce-
dures for determining lag length. 
The first step in Hsiao's procedure is to perform a series 
of autoregressive regressions on the dependent variable. In the 
first regression, the dependent variable has a lag of one. This 
increases by one in each succeeding regression. Here, we esti-
mate M regressions of the form: 
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m 
(4) G(t) = a+ Sum b(t-l)G(t-1) + e(i) 
i=l 
where the values of m range from 1 to M. For each regression, 
we compute the FPE in the following manner 
T+m+ 1 (5) FPE(m) = ESS(m)!I' 
T- m-1 
Where: T is the sample size, and FPE(m) and ESS(m) are the 
final prediction error and the sum of squared errors, respec-
tively. The optimal lag length, m*, is the lag length which pro-
duces the lowest FPE. Having determined m* additional 
regressions expand the equation with the lags on the other 
variable added sequentially in the same manner used to deter-
mine m*. Thus we estimate four regressions of the form: 
m* n 
(6) G(t) =a+ Sum b(t-l)G(t-1) + Sum c(t-l)D(t-1) + e(i) 
i=l . i=l 
with n ranging from one to four. Computing the final predic-
tion error for each regression as: 
T+ m* + n + 1 
PE(m* ,n) = --------·- ESS(m* ,n)/I' 
T- m* - n - 1 
we choose the optimal lag length for D, n* as the lag length 
which produces the lowest FPE. Using the final prediction 
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error to determine lag length is equivalent to using a series of 
F tests with variable levels of significance.12 
The first term measures the estimation error and the 
second term measures the modeling error. The FPE criterion 
has a certain optimality property that "balances the risk due to 
bias when a lower order is selected and the risk due to increas-
es in the variance when a higher order is selected."13 As noted 
by Judge14 et. al., an intuitive reason for using the FPE criteri-
on is that longer lags increase the first term but decrease the 
RSS of the second term, and thus the two opposing forces are 
optimally balanced when their product reaches its minimum. 
Depending on the value of the final prediction errors, 
four cases are possible: (a) Government Deficits cause Pub-
lic Expenditures when the prediction error for public expen-
ditures decreases when the government deficit is included in 
the expenditure equation. In addition, when public expendi-
tures are added to the deficit equation, the final prediction 
error should increase; (b) Public Expenditures causes Gov-
ernment Deficits when the prediction error for public expen-
ditures increases when government deficits are added to the 
regression equation for public expenditures, and is reduced 
when public expenditures are added to the regression equation 
for government deficits; (c) Feedback occurs when the final 
prediction error decreases when government deficits are added 
to the public expenditures equation, and the final prediction 
error decreases when public expenditures are added to the gov-
ernment deficit equation; and (d) No Relationship exists 
when the final prediction error increases both when govern-
ment deficits are added to the public expenditures equation 
and when public expenditures are added to the deficit equa-
tion. 
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES 
The government expenditure data used to carry out the 
causation tests15 was derived from data provided by the World 
• 
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Bank.16 figures in: Gross Domestic Product and the GDP price 
deflator is from various issues of the International Monetary 
Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook. All 
variables were deflated by the GDP deflator and are in con-
stant 1985 prices. For best statistical results, 17 the variables 
were transformed into their logarithmic values.IS 
To determine the robustness of our findings and 
whether the results were sensitive to the definition of key vari-
ables various measures of the deficit were examined. These 
included the actual or realized deficit, the expected deficit (the 
predicted value obtained by regressing each year's deficit on its 
value for the previous year, the unexpected deficit (the differ-
ence between each year's actual deficit and that anticipated 
based on past patterns) and finally deviations of the deficit 
from its longer run growth path (the actual deficit minus the 
exponential trend in the deficit). The same definitions were 
used in deriving series for public domestic borrowing. 
Relationships were considered valid if they were statis-
tically significant at the ninety-five percent level of confidence. 
That is, if ninety-five percent of the time we could conclude 
that they had not occurred by pure chance, we considered them 
statistically significant. 
As noted above, there is no theoretical reason to believe 
that fiscal deficits and government expenditures by category 
have a set lag relationship--that is they impact on one another 
over a fixed time period. To find the optimal adjustment period 
of impact, lag structures of up to six years were estimated. The 
lag structure with the highest level of statistical significance 
was the one chosen best depict the relationship under consider-
ation (the optimal lag reported in Tables 1through5).19 
RESULTS 
Two sets of causality tests were performed. The first 
set, (Tables 1 and 2) examines the interaction of the four broad 
categories of government expenditures: (a) defense, (b) con-
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sumption, and (c) general government investment and (d) 
infrastructure on: (a) private sector investment in large scale 
manufacturing and (b) private investment in small scale man-
ufacturing enterprises. 
The second set of estimates examine the interrelation-
ships between these four types of government expenditures 
and movements in the fiscal deficit. Since previous studies 
have suggested that it is not the deficits per se, but rather the 
method by which they are financed (domestic versus foreign) 
that determines whether crowding out occurs, the second set of 
tables also takes the analysis a step further by examining the 
corresponding link between public sector expenditures and the 
pattern of public sector domestic/foreign borrowing. Put differ-
ently even though public expenditures in certain areas may 
lead to increased budgetary deficits, crowding out might not 
occur if the authorities are able to fund this expenditure 
through foreign borrowing. 
The analysis produced a number of interesting patterns 
that are summarized in Tables 1-5. Those for public expendi-
tures and private investment in manufacturing (Tables 1 and 
2) provide an interesting contrast in the manner in which pub-
lic sector spending has provided a stimulus to private sector 
capital formation. Specifically (Tables 1 and 2): 
1. The impact of defense expenditures (Table 1) on invest-
ment in large scale manufacturing appears consistently 
strong across all measures20 of this category of expendi-
tures. Also, in all cases the impact lag appears quite 
short, averaging only a year. 
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Table 1 
Pakistan: Interaction of Public Expenditures, Deficits, Borrowing 









Optimal Lag (years) 3.0 1.0 2.0 
Final Prediction Error (0.llE-1) (0.65E-2) (0.26E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.72 1.91 1.62 
Adjusted r2 0.982 0.990 0.985 






Optimal Lag (years) 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 
Final Prediction Error (0.llE-1) (0.12E-1) (0.69E-2) (0.43E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1. 72 1.65 1.69 1.98 
Adjusted r2 0.982 0.981 0.975 0.985 
Dominant Pattern: Investment->Consumption (+w) 
Public Investment (actual) 
Optimal Lag (years) 















Dominant Pattern: ;Private-> Public ( +m) 
Public Investment (infrastructure) 
Optimal Lag (years) 3.0 
Final Prediction Error (O.llE-1) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.72 


















Notes: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests. A Hsaio 
Procedure was incorporated to determine the optimal lag. All variables esti-
mated in lograthmic form. The dominant pattern is that with the lowest final 
prediction error. The signs(+.·) represent the direction of impact. In the case 
of feedback the two signs represent the lowest final prediction error of rela-
tionships B and D. Each of the variables was regressed with 1, 2, 3, and 4 
year lags. Strength assessment (s=strong; m=moderate; w=weak) based on 
the size of the standardized regression coefficient and t test of statistical sig-
nificance. 
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2. In contrast to the case for large scale manufacturing, 
defense expenditures have no appreciable effect on pri-
vate investment in small scale manufacturing (Table 2). 
Table 2 
Pakistan: Interaction of Public Expenditures, Deficits, Borrowing 









Optimal Lag (years) 





















Optimal Lag (years) 2.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 
Final Prediction Error (0.22E-2) (0.24E-2) (0.69E-2) (0.74E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.10 2.07 1.70 1.74 
Adjusted r2 0.986 0.988 0.975 0.975 
Dominant Pattern: Consumption-> In vestment( +w) 
Public Investment (actual) 
Optimal Lag (years) 















Dominant Pattern: Private-->Public (+m) 
Public Investment (infrastructure) 
Optimal Lag (years) 2.0 
Final Prediction Error (0.22E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.10 


















Notes: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests. A Hsaio 
Procedure was incorporated to determine the optimal lag. All variables estimat-
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ed in lograthmic form. The dominant pattern is that with the lowest final pre-
diction error. The signs (+.-) represent the direction of impact. In the case of 
feedback the two signs represent the lowest final prediction error of relation-
ships B and D. Each of the variables was regressed with 1, 2, 3, and 4 year 
lags. Strength assessment (s=strong; m=moderate; w=weak) based on the size 
of the standardized regression coefficient and t test of statistical significance. 
3. As a basis of comparison, public sector expenditures on 
consumption does not provide a stimulus to private 
investment in large scale manufacturing(Table 1). Here, 
the pattern is largely one whereby expanded private 
sector activity induces the government to provide addi-
tional services. For public services (consumption), this 
process occurs over a fairly long period with an average 
lag of three years. 
4. While one might anticipate that general government 
investment, especially in the areas of infrastructural 
expansion, would provide a stimulus to private invest-
ment in manufacturing, this does not appear to be the 
case (Table 1). In fact, causation is generally from pri-
vate investment to public. For actual public investment 
(including both infrastructural and non-infrastructural 
components) the lag is ,rather short-a year. For longer 
term infrastructural investment (here proxied as 
expected investment) the lag tends to be about three 
years. Interestingly deviations of public investment 
from its historical exponential trend tend to impact neg-
atively on private investment in manufacturing. 
5. Private investment in small scale manufacturing is 
again affected differently than that in larger scale 
firms. In this case (Table 2) public consumption expen-
ditures provide a weak stimulus to the private sector. 
This lag is short, averaging about a year. 
6. Private investment in smaller scale industrial ventures 
interacted with public invE!stment in a manner some-
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what similar to that found in larger scale enterprises. 
However several minor differences do appear to charac-
terize investment by the private sector. First, the lag 
between private investment and the government provi-
sion of infrastructure (anticipated investment) was 
shorter (one year) in the case of small scale firms. Sec-
ondly, while unanticipated (the difference between actu-
al and anticipated) public investment impacted nega-
tively (not shown here) on private investment in small-
er scale firms, there were no statistically significant 
patterns between private investment and deviations 
from the exponential trend in public investment. 
As noted above, in looking for an explanation for these 
patterns, several previous papers have indicated that public 
sector crowding out of private investment may be occurring as 
a result of stepped-up government borrowing in the domestic 
financial markets. To examine this possibility, an analysis sim-
ilar to that performed above was used to identify the linkages 
and causality patterns between the different broad types of 
public expenditures (defense, consumption, and general gov-
ernment investment) and potential sources of funding (deficits, 
domestic borrowing, and foreign borrowing). 
Again several interesting patterns appeared (Tables 3-
5): 
1. Of the three types of government expenditures, those 
allocated to defense appear to have the most complex 
budgetary linkages. In one sense the military faces a 
hard budgetary constraint in the sense that increases in 
past deficits tend to suppress the expansion in alloca-
tions to the military (Table 3). On the other hand 
increased defense expenditures do force an expansion in 
future deficits. 
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Table3 
Pakistan: Interaction of Public Expenditures, 
and the Fiscal Deficit, 1972-1991 
Causation Patterns 
Invest Invest Expend 
Invest Expend Expend 
Defense Expenditures 
Optimal Lag (years) 2.0 1.0 3.0 
Final Prediction Error (0.27E-1) (0.27E-2) (0.19) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.62 1.76 1.97 
Adjusted r2 0.985 0.986 0.584 
Dominant Pattern: Feedback (-w,+w) 
Public Consumption 
Optimal Lag (years) 















Dominant Pattern: Feedback (-w, +w) 
General Public Investment 
Optimal Lag (years) 















Dominant Pattern: Feedback ( +w, +s) 
General Public Infrastructure 
Optimal Lag (years) 1.0 
Final Prediction Error (0.93E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.57 




























Notes: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests. A Hsaio 
Procedure was incorporated to determine the optimal lag. All variables esti-
mated in lograthmic form. The dominant pattern is that with the lowest final 
prediction error. The signs(+.-) represent tpe direction of impact. In the case 
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of faedback the two signs represent the lowest final prediction error of rela-
tionships B and D. Each of the variables was regressed with 1, 2, 3, and 4 
year lags. Strength assessment (s=strong; m=moderate; w=weak) based on 
the size of the standardized regression coefficient and t test of statistical sig-
nificance. 
2. This same general framework carried over to the bor-
rowing patterns (Tables 4 and 5) associated with mili-
tary expenditures. For most measures of domestic bor-
rowing, higher growth rates in funding from the domes-
tic markets tends to suppress the expansion in future 
military expenditures. These suppressing effects are 
most important in cases where the rate of borrowing 
(domestic or foreign) expands over its anticipated (or 
longer term) growth rate. Still, feedback effects are pre-
sent whereby military expenditures are in turn general-
ly funded in part through both domestic and foreign 
borrowing. 
Table 4 
Pakistan: Interaction of Public Expenditures, 
and Public Sector Borrowing in Domestic Markets, 1972-1991 
Causation Patterns 
Invest Invest Expend Expend 
Invest Expend Expend Invest 
Defense Expenditures 
Optimal Lag (years) 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Final Prediction Error (0.27E-2) (0.27E-2) (0.26) (0.12) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.62 2.43 2.16 2.28 
Adjusted r2 0.985 0.987 0.284 0.444 
Dominant Pattern: Feedback (+w,+w) 
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Public Consumption 
Optimal Lag (years) 3.0 1.0 3.0 4.0 
Final Prediction Error (0.69E-2) (0.77E-2) (0.26) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.70 1.69 2.17 




Dominant Pattern: Consumption.,.-> Borrowing ( +w) 
General Public Investment 
Optimal Lag (years) 1.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 
Final Prediction Error (0.93E-2) (O.lOE-1) (0.26) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.57 1.58 2.17 




Dominant Pattern: Investment-> Borrowing ( +m) 
General Public Infrastructure 
Optimal Lag (years) 1.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 
Final Prediction Error (0.93E-2) (0.lOE-1) (0.26) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.57 1.81 2.17 
Adjusted r2 0.936 0.909 0.284 




Notes: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests. A Hsaio 
Procedure was incorporated to determine the optimal lag. All variables esti-
mated in lograthmic form. The dominant pattern is that with the lowest final 
prediction error. The signs(+.-) represent the direction of impact. In the case 
of feedback the two signs represent the lowest final prediction error of rela-
tionships B and D. Each of the variables was regressed with 1, 2, 3, and 4 
year lags. Strength assessment (s=st_rong; m=moderate; w=weak) based on 
the size of the standardized regression coefficient and t test of statistical sig-
nificance. 
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Table 5 
Pakistan: Interaction of Public Expenditures, and Public Sector Bor-








Foreign Borrowing (actual) 
Optimal Lag (years) 2.0 
Final Prediction Error (0.27E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.62 









Dominant Pattern: Feedback ( +w,+w) 
Public Consumption 
Optimal Lag (years) 















Dominant Pattern: Feedback (-m, +m) 
General Public Investment 
Optimal Lag (years) 















Dominant Pattern: No Relationship 
General Public Investment 
Optimal Lag (years) 1.0 2.0 4.0 
Final Prediction Error (0.93E-2) (0.85E-2) (0.36E-1) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.57 2.34 1. 77 

















Dominant Pattern: Borrowing->Investment (-w) 
Notes: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests. A Hsaio 
Procedure was incorporated to determine the optimal lag. All variables esti-
mated in lograthmic form. The dominant pattern is that with the lowest final 
prediction error. The signs(+.-) represent the direction of impact. In the case ~ 
of feedback the two signs represent the lowest final prediction error of rela-
tionships B and D. Each of the variables was regressed with 1, 2, 3, and 4 
year lags. Strength assessment (s=strong; m=moderate; w=weak) based on 
the size of the standardized regression coefficient and t test of statistical sig-
nificance. • 
310 
Looney/Problems of Capital Formation in Pakistani Manufacturing 
3. Since a large portion of public consumption consists of 
allocations to the military, the budgetary patterns of 
this expenditure category are a bit similar to that char-
acterizing defense, particularly consumption's relation-
ship to the fiscal deficit (Table 3). 
4. Several important differences do occur however. The 
major difference between defense expenditures and 
public consumption is associated with the manner in 
which each is actually funded. Increased growth in pub-
lic consumption definitely contributes to expanded 
domestic borrowing requirements over time (Table 4). 
Also the expansion in public consumption appears to be 
more constrained than defense during periods of 
expanded foreign borrowing (Table 5). 
5. Of the three types of government expenditures exam-
ined here, general government investment tends to 
have the strongest impact on the public sector deficit 
(Table 3). 
6. For all four measures of the deficit,21 increases in gen-
eral public investment tends to result in expanded fis-
cal imbalance (Table 3).·While expanded deficits (actual 
and deviations from the exponential trend) facilitate a 
future expansion in public investment, this effect is 
weak relative to the impact of investment on the 
deficit. 
7. A clear link also exists between expanded public sector 
investment and increased future domestic borrowing 
requirements (Table 4) Interestingly enough few links 
exist between the growth in public investment and the 
country's pattern of external pubic borrowing (Table 5). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
While the results presented above do not provide a 
definitive proof of the existence of the crowding out mechanism 
in Pakistan, they are quite consistent with what one might 
find if the phenomena were present. Public investment and 
infrastructural development appear to have the least stimulat-
ing (and sometimes negative) affect on private sector invest-
ment. This is ironic given that a major purpose of these alloca-
tions is to provide a stimulus to follow on private investment. 
Clearly this effect stems from the large demands placed on the 
domestic capital market by this type of expenditure. 
At the other extreme is defense. Again a somewhat 
ironic pattern exists by which expanded military expenditures 
provide a generally strong stimulus to private investment in 
large scale private manufacturing. While the analyses does not 
let us identify the cause of this stimulus (general Keynesian 
demand expansion and/or direct linkages to the country's mili-
tary procurement program), the fact remains that the govern-
ment has shown restraint in funding defense expenditures 
once domestic borrowing begin to accelerate. 
General public consumption falls somewhere between 
defense and investment in affecting the private sector's will-
ingness (or ability) to commit capital to manufacturing. While 
the government does fund increased consumption through 
expanded domestic borrowing, the magnitudes involved are not 
nearly as great as with investment. Thus, government con-
sumption is still able to provide a net positive stimulus to 
small scale private investors (who presumably are not as 
reliant on the domestic capital markets as are their larger 
scale counterparts). 
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20. 
21. 
government expenditure are also included in the set of 
main findings. The findings for the other variable defi-
nitions are available from the author upon request. 
Again those for anticipated (expected) and unanticipat-
ed (unexpected) are not presented in detail. They are 
however available from the author upon request. 
Again only the results for the actual (realized) deficit 
are presented here. 
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